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I.

INTRODUCTION

[1]
The advertisements you see while browsing the Internet are rarely
accidental. For instance, Alliance Data, one of many new companies in
the booming data-marketing industry, can instantaneously recognize that a
user visiting their client’s website is Joel Stein, a thirty-nine year-old,
college educated male, who makes over $125,000 a year. 1 Alliance Data
also knows that Joel is likely to make purchases online, but only spends
about $25 dollars a purchase. 2 Using this information, and the specifics of
*Matthew Kirsch, J.D. Candidate, 2012, The George Washington University Law
School; Member, The George Washington International Law Review; BBA, Emory
University, 2009, Cum Laude.
1

See Joel Stein, Data Mining: How Companies Now Know Everything About You, TIME
MAGAZINE BUSINESS (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,
2058114,00.html.
2

See id.
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over 100 of Joel’s past online purchases, Alliance Data creates
advertisements specifically tailored to Joel and displays them as he
continues to browse the Internet. 3
[2]
Unlike the majority of Internet users, Joel Stein, as a reporter,
discovered the extent to which new data mining companies tracked him
online. 4 During his investigation, Joel found various data marketing
companies that held detailed profiles about him, compiled from his online
behavior. 5 With varying degrees of accuracy, these profiles “knew” about
Joel’s mortgage, car, hobbies, travel desires and more. 6 Some of Joel’s
discoveries were comical, such as the BlueKai profile that “knew” Joel
was a nineteen year-old woman; most likely based on a recent splurge for
his wife at an online lingerie website. 7 Other revelations raised more
serious concerns, such as when the CEO of Reputation.com found Joel’s
social security number in a matter of hours. 8 What these data mining
companies know, or think they know, about Joel, highlights some of the
concerns raised when corporations own, trade, and sell profiles filled with
the intimate and private details of citizen’s lives.
[3]
This Article will argue that the upcoming revision of the European
Union’s (“EU”) Data Protection Directive should require advertisers to
utilize and respect a “Do-Not-Track” mechanism in order to provide
consumers with a meaningful mechanism to consent, or refuse to consent,
to the online collection of their data for use in behavioral advertising. In
Part II, the Article will provide an overview of the EU’s current data
protection framework. This Part will also look at the status of consent
3

See id.

4

See id.

5

See id.

6

See Stein, supra note 1.

7

See id.

8

See id.
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under the current framework. It will then explain the EU’s motivations for
the upcoming revision of the Data Protection Directive. Next, this Part
will explore the emergence of the behavioral advertising industry,
followed by a discussion of some concerns this growth raises. It will then
examine Privacy by Design and Privacy Enhancing Technologies, broad
categories of technologies designed to enhance electronic privacy.
Finally, this Part will consider the sufficiency of industry self-regulation.
Part III will argue for the implementation of a “Do-Not-Track” mechanism
to provide citizens in the EU with a meaningful way to express informed
consent to the online collection of their personal information for the
purposes of behavioral advertising.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Data Protection in the European Union

[4]
In the 1970’s, the growing use of computers to process personal
information led to the first calls for comprehensive data protection
legislation. 9 As a result, in 1995, the European Commission (“EC” or “the
Commission”) adopted Directive 95/46 (the “Data Protection Directive” or
“Directive”), which established a compressive framework for the
processing of personal data. 10 The Data Protection Directive derives its
legal authority from Article 95 of the European Community Treaty, which
allows for the creation of legislation designed to harmonize the internal
market within the EU. 11

9

See PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
(3d ed. 2009).

TO

UK

AND

EU LAW 1

10

See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU) [hereinafter Data Protection
Directive]; CAREY, supra note 9, at 5.

11

See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 95, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C
321E) 37 (consolidated version); Alfonso Scirocco, The Lisbon Treaty and the Protection
of Personal Data in the European Union, DATAPROTECTIONREVIEW.EU (Aug. 8, 2008),
http://www.madrid.org/cs/Satellite?c=CMRevistaFP&cid=1142425661164&esArticulo=t
rue&idRevistaElegida=1142398920499&language=en&pag=1&pagename=RevistaDatos
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[5]
The Data Protection Directive has two principal aims. 12 The first
is the preservation of the fundamental right to data protection, and the
second is to facilitate the free flow of personal data between and within
EU member states. 13 To accomplish its twin aims the Directive sets out a
general framework for the processing of personal data. 14 Article 6
describes one of the central tenants of this framework, that “the processing
of personal data must . . . be carried out with the consent of the data
subject . . . .” 15 Further, certain categories of data, such as religious, racial
or health information are considered sensitive, and the Directive prohibits
processing this data without the explicit affirmative consent of the data
subject. 16 The Directive also attempts to ensure the fair collection of data
by requiring that data subjects receive notice of the “identity of the [data]
controller[,] . . . the purposes of the processing . . . [and] any further
information such as the recipients . . . [or whether the data subject has a]
right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him … .” 17

PersonalesIngles%2FPage%2FRDPI_home_RDP&siteName=RevistaDatosPersonalesIng
les.
12

See CAREY, supra note 9, at 6.

13

See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive
Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 4, COM (2010) 609
final
(Nov.
4,
2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/
consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf [hereinafter Call for Revision]; see also
CAREY, supra note 9, at 6.
14

See CAREY, supra note 9, at 5-6.

15

Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, Preamble, para. 30.

16

See id. art. 8, paras. 1, 2(a). Certain narrow exceptions apply. See id. art. 8, para. 2(b)(e).
17

Id. art. 10.
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[6]
A landmark aspect of the Data Protection Directive is its formal
recognition of the fundamental right to the protection of personal data, as
set out in Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 18 Article 8
provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection
of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for
specified purposes and on the basis of the
consent of the person concerned or some
other legitimate basis laid down by law.
Everyone has the right of access to data
which has been collected concerning him or
her, and the right to have it rectified. 19
However, the Directive’s recognition of this right does not give Article 8
binding legal effect; for many years, the Charter of Fundamental Rights
operated merely as a political commitment. 20 This changed in 2007 when
the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly included the right to the protection of
personal data in Article 16b, resulting in the constitutional recognition of
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 21 When the Treaty of
18

See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000
O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter EU Charter of Fundamental Rights]; Data Protection
Directive, supra note 10, Preamble, paras. 2,7.
19

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 18, art. 8.

20

See Press Release, Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Presidents of the Commission,
European Parliament and Council Sign and Solemnly Proclaim the Charter in Strasbourg
(Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refere
nce=IP/07/1916&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
21

See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. 16 B & Declaration 20, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007
O.J. (C 306) 1, 51, 257 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]; see also Call for Revision, supra
note 13, at 4; Press Release, Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 20.
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Lisbon entered into force in 2009, the right to the protection of personal
data finally had an independent, constitutional, and binding legal basis. 22
B.

Consent in the EU Data Protection Framework

[7]
As will be discussed in more detail in Part II(C), the EU is in the
process of revising the Data Protection Directive. 23 A major reason for
the revision of the Directive is the non-uniform implementation by EU
Member States of what constitutes informed and free consent, especially
in the context of behavioral advertising. 24 This Part will begin by
examining the meaning of consent within the data protection framework,
with a focus on the new e-Privacy Directives. It will then examine the
Article 29 Working Party’s 2010 opinion on informed consent to
behavioral advertising under the existing data protection framework. 25
Finally, it will attempt to derive the meaning of consent from relevant
enforcement actions and case law.
i.

Consent in the e-Privacy Directives

[8]
In 2002, as a supplement to the Data Protection Directive, the EU
adopted the e-Privacy Directive to address “the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications
sector.” 26 In 2009, the e-Privacy Directive was amended to further

22

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 4; Press Release, Charter of Fundamental
Rights, supra note 20.
23

See infra Part II.C.

24

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 8-9. See generally infra Part II.D (discussing
behavioral advertising in detail).
25

See infra Part II.B.ii.

26

See Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EU) [hereinafter e-Privacy
Directive].
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address the changing landscape of the Internet. 27 The e-Privacy Directive
and its amending Directive do not change or amend the Data Protection
Directive itself, rather the new directives provide an extra set of
regulations specific to electronic communications. 28
Because the
amended e-Privacy Directive addresses many of the same issues the
revision of the Data Protection Directive intends to address, it is important
that the two directives complement each other. 29
[9]
A major provision added by the amended e-Privacy Directive
requires data controllers to inform data subjects when placing cookies or
similar tracking devices on a user’s terminal equipment. 30 Data subjects
must have the right to object to the use of cookies and other tracking
devices. 31 Unfortunately, despite its emphasis on cookies and consent, the
amended e-Privacy Directive failed to clear up the confusion over implicit
consent with respect to browser settings. 32 For example, a recent draft of
Finland’s implementing legislation for the amended e-Privacy Directive
27

See Council Directive 2009/136, art. 4, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, 22 (EU) [hereinafter
Amended e-Privacy Directive] (noting that the 2009 amendment of the e-Privacy
Directive must be implemented by May 25, 2011).
28

See CAREY, supra note 9, at 12.

29

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 7.

30

See Amended e-Privacy Directive, supra note 27, Preamble, para. 66. For purposes of
this Article “terminal equipment” is a term meant to include a person’s personal
computer.
31

See id.

32

See Eija Warma & Vilja Kemppainen, Implementation of E-Privacy Directive in
Finland: Will User-Friendliness Override Privacy in the Use of Cookies in Internet
Services?, CASTREN & SNELLMAN (Feb. 18, 2011), http://castrensnellman.
meteoriitti.com/Page/c1ccbac8-1bad-436e-bb79-e1ffaa00df14.aspx?groupId=cdeed8818278-43d3-9994-ccf6a6a633e7&announcementId=b841f3d0-0d3a-4c72-b9b3-3f036b00
332e (“Recital 66 of the Directive states that the user’s consent may be received through
browser settings. As default settings of major browsers generally allow cookies, this
standpoint would make the Directive’s impact on business quite minor.”).

7
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specifically allows for a user’s browser settings to provide consent. 33
Contrast Finland’s approach with the UK’s, where Parliament is
considering simply “copying and pasting” the language of the amended ePrivacy Directive into national law and letting the courts figure out any
ambiguities regarding the meaning of consent. 34 Also, both France and
the Netherlands have passed similar laws requiring prior opt-in consent for
cookies. 35
ii.

The Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion

[10] Despite the present ambiguities regarding consent in the data
protection framework, a 2010 opinion issued by the Article 29 Working
Party may still present a comprehensive definition of consent. 36 The
newly amended e-Privacy Directive and the May 2011 deadline to
implement the Directive into each Member State’s national laws prompted
33

See id.

34

See Out-Law.com, UK Passes Buck on Europe's Cookie Law with Copy-Paste
UK
(Sept.
17,
2010),
Proposal:
You
Sort
It
out,
THE REG.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/17/eu_cookie_law/print.html.
35

Hunton & Williams LLP, France Introduces Prior Opt-in Consent for Cookies,
AND INFORMATION SECURITY LAW BLOG, http://www.huntonprivacyblog.
PRIVACY
com/2011/08/articles/european-union-1/france-introduces-prior-optin-consent-forcookies/ (specifying that opt-in consent may be given “via user controlled settings on the
relevant device”); Nicole Wolters Ruckert and David Korteweg, New Dutch Cookie Law
Requires Prior Consent from Internet Users, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS., https://
www.privacy association.org/public ations/2011_06_28_new_du tch_cookie_law_
requires_prior_consent_from_Internet_users (defining consent as “freely given, specific
and well-informed”).
36

See Opinion 2/2010 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on ‘Online
Behavioural Advertising,’ WP 171 (June 22, 2010) 3, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf [hereinafter
WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising]; CAREY, supra note 9, at 9 (“Article
29 of the Directive set up a Working Party . . . to act as an independent advisory body . . .
. Thus when considering the meaning of . . . the Directive . . . regard should be had to any
relevant opinion that has been issued by the Working Party.”).
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the issuance of the Working Party’s Opinion on Online Behavioural
Advertising. 37 While the Working Party’s opinions do not hold the force
of law, they are still considered important in interpreting the data
protection framework. 38
[11] The Opinion begins by noting that where the e-Privacy Directive
addresses a specific subject matter, such as the use of cookies, its clauses
should be read as controlling over a conflicting general clause in the
original Data Protection Directive. 39 However, if a cookie collects
information that also fits the definition of personal data under the Data
Protection Directive, then that Directive will apply in addition to the ePrivacy Directive. 40 Consequently, the behavioral advertising industry
will be subject to both the Data Protection Directive and the e-Privacy
Directive because the majority of data collected by third-party cookies will
fall within the Data Protection Directive’s broad definition of personal
data. 41
37

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 3, 7-8.

38

See CAREY, supra note 9, at 9.

39

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 10.

40

See id. at 9. The Directive defines personal data as:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
(‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity . . . .

Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 2. More information on the subtleties and
scope of personal data, as interpreted by the Article 29 Working Party may be found in
Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data. See generally Opinion 4/2007 of the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the ‘Concept of Personal Data,’ WP 136
(June
20,
2007),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/
docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf.
41

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 9 (“If as a
result of placing and retrieving information through the cookie or similar device, the

9
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[12] The Opinion also finds that Article 5(3) of the amended e-Privacy
Directive generally restricts the use of cookies in behavioral advertising. 42
Article 5(3) provides in pertinent part:
Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic
communications networks to store information or to gain
access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a
subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the
subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and
comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive
95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing . .
. . 43
However, an additional explanation in Recital 66 of the amending
Directive tempers this seemingly strong language. 44 Recital 66 states:
Third parties may wish to store information on the
equipment of a user, or gain access to information already
stored . . . . The methods of providing information and
offering the right to refuse should be as user-friendly as
possible. . . . Where it is technically possible and effective,
in accordance with the relevant provisions of Directive
95/46/EC, the user’s consent to processing may be
information collected can be considered personal data then, in addition to Article 5(3),
Directive 95/46/EC will also apply.”). Third party cookies will be discussed in more
detail in Part II.D.
42

See id. at 8.

43

e-Privacy Directive, supra note 26, art. 5(3).

44

A Recital is a part of an act or directive whose purpose “is to set out concise reasons
for the chief provisions of the enacting terms, without reproducing or paraphrasing
them.” Joint Practical Guide: Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission, EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/techleg/10.htm (last visited Aug. 21,
2011).
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expressed by using the appropriate settings of a browser or
other application. 45
Article 5(3) will often implicate behavioral advertisers, as it expressly
applies to any party who places cookies or collects information from
existing cookies stored on a data subject’s computer. 46 Thus, most adnetworks, due to their use of cookies, must operate within the confines of
the e-Privacy Directive. 47 Under the Working Party’s interpretation of the
current framework, advertising networks must obtain informed consent
from a data subject. 48 The Working Party claims that consent under
Article 5(3) requires an advertising network to: 1) give the user sufficient
information about the data to be collected, as well as the purpose of the
cookie, before asking a user for consent; 2) obtain consent before ever
placing a cookie or collecting information from a user’s computer; and 3)
allow for a user to revoke their consent. 49
[13] In response to varying interpretations among EU Member States,
the Working Party addresses the question whether a user who fails to
change default browser settings that allow cookies has given sufficient
consent under the aforementioned test. 50 The Opinion states that although
advertising networks and content providers often inform users about thirdparty cookies in their privacy policies, this practice, supported only by
default browser settings, is unlikely to meet the requirements of informed

45

Amended e-Privacy Directive, supra note 27, at 34.

46

See WP29 Opinion on Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 10.

47

See id.

48

See id.

49

See id. at 13.

50

See id.
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consent under the data protection framework. 51 The Working Party gives
three rationales for this conclusion.
[14] First, it concludes that under Article 2(h) of the Data Protection
Directive, a browser cannot give valid consent for the collection and
processing of a user’s information by default. 52 The Working Party bases
this finding on the average data subject’s ignorance of the extent to which
companies track online behavior for marketing purposes. 53 Further, if a
company’s privacy policy instructs a data subject to change his browser
settings to avoid tracking, the average Internet user may not have the
technological savvy to properly change the settings. 54 Second, even if
browser settings could convey a user’s informed consent, the Working
Party argues against the ability to bypass a user’s wishes through
emerging technologies to track a user who has actively set his browser to
block third-party cookies. 55 Third, browser settings cannot accurately
discern user consent and may construe initial or partial acceptance of
cookies as sufficient to allow the placement of all future cookies, whether
by different companies or for purposes unrelated to that prior consent. 56
[15] The Working Party also addressed the efficacy of an alternative
consent mechanism, namely the opt-out programs offered by individual
websites, ad-networks, and self-regulatory initiatives. 57 While the
51

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 13.

52

See id. at 14.

53

See id.

54

See id. (noting that only one of the four major browsers currently blocks third-party
cookies by default upon installation).
55

See id. Examples of emerging technologies would include flash cookies, tracking
beacons, or deep packet inspection. Id.
56

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 14.

57

See id. at 15.
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Opinion recognizes that these mechanisms attempt to complement or fix
the problems created by securing consent through browser settings, it
concludes they are insufficient. 58 This is primarily because the average
user will not know where or how to access the opt-out. 59 Few users
realize that, by not actively seeking the opportunity to opt-out, they are
actually opting-in and offering their informed consent to be tracked. 60
Additionally, the failure to opt-out is a non-reaction that, by its nature,
happens after data collection has already begun. 61 A failure to opt-out is
not prior-informed consent as required by Article 5(3). 62
[16] Finally, the Working Party expresses the view that prior opt-in
mechanisms better deliver informed consent. 63 The Opinion suggests that
a company should notify a user before receiving, storing, or sending a
cookie, and the information should contain specific details about each
cookie. 64 These details should include the identity of the advertising
network, a disclaimer regarding what information will be collected, and a
description of how the information will show the user targeted
advertisements. 65 After a user receives this message, they should have the
choice of whether or not to consent. 66 In order to address the practical
problem of deciding to individually consent to an overwhelming number
58

See id.

59

See id.

60

See id.

61

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 15.

62

See id. at 16.

63

See id.

64

See id.

65

See id.

66

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 16.
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of cookies, the Working Party suggests that consenting to one cookie
should validate all the data that cookie may collect and transmit for a
limited time, such as one year. 67
iii.

Consent in Enforcement Actions and Case Law

[17] While enforcement actions under the data protection framework
have remained relatively limited, it is useful to examine the few instances
in which a Member State’s Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) have
enforced a data protection directive with regard to a breach of the
directive’s consent requirements. 68 The largest penalty in the Data
Protection Directive’s history was levied over a consent violation in
2001. 69 The Spanish Data Protection Agency fined the television network
Zeppelin TV one million euros for transmitting the personal data of
television show participants to third-party advertisers without the
participants’ consent. 70 More recently in 2008, the Italian DPA fined GS,
a supermarket chain, for using information collected from reward card
applications and customer purchases to conduct targeted advertising
without their customers’ consent. 71 Finally, the German DPA brought the
most recent enforcement action in 2010 against Deutsche Postbank AG for

67

See id.

68

See CAREY, supra note 9, at 183.

69

See TECH., MEDIA & TELECOMM. GRP., LINKLATERS, DATA PROTECTED 102 (Nov.
2005), available at www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/tmt/dat aprotected05.pdf.
70

See CAREY, supra note 9, at 183.

71

See Supermarket Chain Fined for Unlawful Use of Customer Data, EUR. PRIVACY & ECOM. ALERT (Hunton & Williams, L.L.P., Brussels, Belg.), Aug. 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.hunton.com/european_data_protection_and_privacy
(follow
“Alerts”
hyperlink; then follow “More” hyperlink; and select “European Privacy & E-Commerce
Alert: August 25, 2008” hyperlink).
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allowing thousands of independent sales agents to use the Bank’s
customer records for sales purposes without the consent of its customers. 72
[18] Of the preceding examples, the GS enforcement action proves
most relevant to the analysis of consent in behavioral advertising.
Unfortunately, few details of the enforcement action have been published
and the requisite level of consent necessary to use consumer information
for behavioral advertising purposes remains unclear. 73 However, even if
interpretations of the GS enforcement establish the principle that targeted
advertising requires explicit affirmative consent, it represents one
enforcement action under one of the twenty-seven Member States’
implementing legislation. 74
[19] Case law addressing the issue of consent in a data privacy context
is correspondingly thin, with only one such case heard by the European
Court of Justice. 75 In that case, Bavarian Lager Co., Bavarian Lager
requested a copy of the minutes of a meeting during which various
72

See Hunton & Williams, LLP, German DPA Imposes €120,000 Fine on Deutsche
Postbank AG, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (May 12, 2010, 10:49 AM),
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com.
73

See, e.g., Stop Alle Carte Fedeltà se Spiano nel Carrello Della Spesa [Stop the Loyalty
Cards in the Shopping Cart if You Spy], GARANTE PER LA PROT. DEI DATI PERS. (Reg.
Tribunale di Roma, Rome, Italy), May 21, 2008, available at www.garantepr
ivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1522432 (search engine translation from Italian to English).
74

See generally Declaration of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on ‘Recent
Examples of Enforcement Actions Carried out by Data Protection Authorities’, WP 101
(Nov. 25, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wp
docs/2004/ wp101a_en.pdf (providing examples of data protection enforcement actions in
various member states).
75

See European Comm’n, European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Summary of Caselaw of
EU Courts on Data Protection, at 8, 12 (June 2010) (Laraine Laudati), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/olaf/data/doc/Summary-caselaw-EU-courts.pdf
(examining
European Court of Justice decisions concerning data protection from 2001 to 2010 in
which only one case mentions the issue of consent).
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government officials and industry representatives determined the
company’s ability to sell its product in England. 76 The reply to the request
stated that it would release the minutes with the names of five parties
redacted, including two parties who expressly objected and three who
could not be reached. 77 The Court held that the Commission properly
refused to release the five names and established that, at least in these
circumstances, silence or a failure to respond to a request for consent
could not establish informed and free consent. 78
[20] An earlier case, British Gas Trading v. Data Protection Registrar,
also discusses the principle that silence does not amount to consent. 79 In
that case, “the British Data Protection Tribunal drew a distinction between
new and existing customers for the purpose of determining when the
requirement of consent would be satisfied.” 80 The Tribunal held that new
customers of British Gas consented to advertising if they had the chance to
opt-out in their initial contract for service. 81 However when British Gas
sent existing customers an additional opt out form, their failure to return
the form could not qualify as consent. 82
[21] Given the dearth of enforcement actions and case law on the
requirement of consent in the context of data protection, it is hard to draw
76

See Case C-28/08 P, Comm'n v. Bavarian Lager Co., 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 687,
at *20 (June 29, 2010).
77

See id.

78

See id. at *40-42.

79

See British Gas Trading Ltd. v. Data Prot. Reg., [1997/98] 1 Info. T.L.R. 393, at 41516 (Eng.), available at http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/i162/
british_gas.pdf.
80

CAREY, supra note 9, at 67; see British Gas, [1997/98] 1 Info .T.L.R. at 415-16.

81

See British Gas, [1997/98] 1 Info. T.L.R. at 415-16.

82

See id. at 416.
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a general picture of the status quo from either of these sources. This
ambiguity, combined with the wide variety of implementing legislation, is
what the European Commission hopes to clarify by updating the Data
Protection Directive. 83
C.

Revising the Data Protection Directive

[22] On November 4, 2010, the Commission explained the need to
revise and update the original Data Protection Directive as a way to meet
various challenges that have emerged over the past fifteen years. 84 One
such challenge is the threat posed by newer and increasingly sophisticated
methods of collecting and analyzing personal data that have allowed for
more effective targeting of individuals based on their behavior. 85 Another
major concern is the lack of uniformity between EU Member State’s
implementing legislation, despite the common regulatory framework
provided by the directives. 86 The European Data Protection Supervisor
(EDPS) views the resolution of these ambiguities as necessary "to enhance
legal certainty, reduce the administrative burden and ensure a level
playing field for economic operators." 87

83

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 2, 8-9.

84

See id. at 2.

85

See id.

86

See id. at 3-4.

87

PETER HUSTINX, OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR ON THE
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE
COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE
REGIONS - "A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION"
12
(2011), available at
http://www.edps.europa.eu/
EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/ Consultation/Opinions/2011/11-0114_Personal_Data_ Protection_EN.pdf [hereinafter EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION
REVISION].
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[23] One specific area of ambiguity between Member State’s legislation
is the requirement of informed and free consent. 88 For example, the
requirements found in various Member States vary widely, from the need
for written consent, to the acceptance of implicit consent derived from a
user’s browser settings. 89 EDPS argues that “[c]onsent that has been
inferred by an action and more particularly by silence or inaction is often
not an unambiguous consent. However, it is not always clear what
constitutes true, unambiguous consent.” 90 EDPS further argues that this
ambiguity prohibits effective consideration of citizens’ rights to the
protection of personal data under the law. 91 The Commission has stated
that any revision of the Directive should clarify the conditions for a data
subject’s ability and right to consent. 92 The Commission also noted that
the framework should strengthen the data subject’s ability to actively
refuse consent. 93 The problems stemming from an ambiguous conception
of informed and free consent are nowhere more apparent than in the
context of behavioral advertising.
D.

Emergence of Behavioral Advertising

[24] Online advertising is big business. In 2009, in the twenty-three EU
Member States for which data is available, advertisers spent over 4.4
Billion euros on display advertising. 94 In the UK, approximately a third of
88

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 9.

89

See id. at 8.

90

EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION REVISION, supra note 87, at 18.

91

See id. at 12.

92

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 9.

93

See id. at 14.

94

See IAB, ADEX 2009 EUROPEAN ONLINE ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 36 (Sept/ 2010),
http://www.iab.fi/assets/Tiedotteet/Adexsyyskuu2010.pdf. The IAB defines Display
Advertising as when “an advertiser pays an Internet company for space to display a static
or hyper-linked banner or logo on one or more of the Internet company’s pages.” Id.
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display advertising utilized behavioral targeting. 95 Assuming this trend
represents other EU Member States with mature advertising markets,
advertisers spent billions of euros on behavioral advertising in 2009. 96
[25] The Article 29 Working Party defines behavioral advertising as the
practice of tracking a data subject’s behavior online, in order to build
profiles which deliver more relevant advertising during future browsing
sessions. 97 The parties involved in behavioral advertising take on three
different roles. The first is the advertising network provider (“adnetwork”) who performs the tracking, analyzes the data, and connects
content publishers with advertisers. 98 The second are advertising
companies that want to promote a product or service to a specific

This type of advertising can be contrasted to the other dominant category, Paid Search,
which the IAB defines as “[f]ees advertisers pay Internet companies to list and/or link
their company site domain name to a specific search word or phrase.” Id.
95

See There's No Need to Talk to Strangers, MARKETINGWEEK (June 2010),
http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/ disciplines/digital/digital-strategy-supplement/theresno-need-to-talk-to-strangers/3015004.article.

96

Specific behavioral advertising data for many Member States is unavailable and its use
may be lower in less mature or sophisticated markets than in the UK. However, the top
three mature markets (the UK, Germany and France) account for 64% of total advertising
revenue in the EU. See IAB, supra note 94, at 5. Thus even if this trend only applies to
the top three mature markets, almost a Billion Euros was still spent on behavioral
advertising in 2009. Id. at 8. Since 2007, venture firms have invested $4.7 billion in 356
online-ad firms, many based on a company’s ability to create a more detailed profile of
individual users than the next company is capable of providing. See Scott Thurm, Online
Trackers Rake in Funding, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2011, at B1.
97

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 3; see also
MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, Who is Proﬁling Who? Invisible Visibility, in REINVENTING
DATA PROTECTION? 239, 243-44 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009) (providing a fictional
example of how online profiling operates).
98

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 5.
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audience. 99 The third role belongs to content publishers, who earn
revenue by displaying the ads on their website. 100
[26] Behavioral advertising companies glean information from a variety
of sources, including what websites a user visits, how the user interacts
with those sites, and content created by the user that is posted on publicly
accessible websites or social networks. 101 This information is then
supplemented with information voluntarily provided by the user to
websites. 102 For instance, by entering your date of birth to verify your age
on an alcohol company’s website, you could add your birthday to your
profile. 103 Similarly, a user’s physical location, as determined from their
IP address, can become part of a user’s profile. 104 Profiles created from
these online sources can combine with traditional offline data to create a
more comprehensive profile. 105
[27] The primary technology used by the behavioral advertising
industry is the tracking cookie. 106 Specifically, ad-network providers
99

Id.

100

Id.

101

See id. at 4.

102

See, e.g., Ad Specifications, HULU (June 15, 2011), http://assets.huluim.com/down
loads/hulu_ad_specs.pdf.

103

See, e.g., Age Verification, LAPHROAIG, http://www.laphroaig.com (last visited Sept.
25, 2011) (showing that when prompted to become a Friend of Laphroaig, the user’s age
is automatically imported into the user’s profile).
104

See, e.g., id.

105

See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofili
ngreportjune2000.pdf [hereinafter ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS].
106

Id. at 3.
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begin the profiling process by tracking users through some form of
“client-side processing” that consists of the physical storage of a
filesuch as a cookieon a data subject’s computer. 107 It is crucial to
distinguish tracking cookies, or third-party cookies, from standard firstparty cookies used by almost every website. 108 While tracking cookies are
a controversial tool used by the behavioral advertising industry, standard
cookies are innocuous and currently essential to the functionality of the
modern Internet. 109
[28] First-party cookies are small text files placed on a computer by
websites that a user visits that allow content providers to enhance basic
functionality with features such as the storage of login information, layout
preferences, and preferred payment methods or shipping addresses. 110
While the discussion of behavioral advertising often includes first-party
cookies, the use of first-party cookies is widely accepted even without a
user’s consent. 111 To avoid confusion, the debate over the use of third107

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 6.

108

See Lori Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy: Cookies and Internet Privacy,
http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory/cc3.html (last visited Sept.
16, 2011) (explaining the dangers between first and third party cookies).

COOKIECENTRAL.COM,

109

See What Went Wrong?, COOKIECENTRAL.COM, http://www.cookiecentral.com/coo
kie5.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
110

See Lori Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy: Introduction, COOKIECENTRAL.COM,
http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2011); Lori
Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy: The Purpose of Cookies, COOKIECENTRAL.COM,
http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2011);
Implementing Machine Language Privacy Requirements – User: First-Party Cookie,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WEB ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.osec.d
oc.gov/webresources/P3P_User_Admin_files/TextMostly/Slide17.html (last updated
May 14, 2010).
111

Implementing Machine Language Privacy Requirements – User: Cookies, DEP’T OF
COMMERCE WEB ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.osec.doc.gov/webre sources/P3P
_User_Admin_files/TextMostly/Slide10.html (last updated May 14, 2010); see
Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy: Cookies and Internet Privacy, supra note 108.

21

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue1

party tracking cookies, discussed in more detail below, should not
consider first-party cookies.
[29] Typically, an ad-network places a tracking cookie on a user’s
computer when a user first visits the website of one of the ad-network’s
clients. 112 Once the ad-network places the cookie, it can recognize it
anytime the same user browses to a webpage where the ad-network may
operate. 113 By re-accessing the cookie at each new site the user visits, the
ad-network builds a profile based on the user’s online behavior. 114 Some
of the Internet’s most visited websites allow multiple ad-networks to place
tracking cookies on a user’s computer, a practice that can result in as many
as 200 separate cookies being placed on a user’s computer in a single
visit. 115
[30] As technologies emerge to help users exercise their privacy rights
regarding cookies, ad-networks develop new technologies at an even faster
pace. 116 While older versions of cookies had expirations after which they
no longer functioned, persistent cookies may remain active until deleted
by the user. 117 Ad-networks are also experimenting with hard to erase
tracking technologies, such as flash cookies, tracking beacons, biometric
profiling and deep packet inspection. 118 These technologies can track
112

WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 6.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

See Julia Angwin, The Web's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31,
2010, at W1; What They Know, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, http://blogs.wsj.com/wtk/ (last
visited Sept. 14, 2011) (finding that dictionary.com places 234 tracking files in a single
visit, comcast.net places 151, careerbuilder.com places 118, and msn.com places 207).

116

See, e.g., WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 6.

117

See id.

118

See id.; Julia Angwin, Latest in Web Tracking: Stealthy 'Supercookies,' WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 18, 2011, at A1; Steve Stecklow & Paul Sonne, What They Know: A Wall Street
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users outside of the controls built into today’s web-browsers, thus
depriving users of the already limited ability to control their privacy
settings. 119 While the details of these new methods are technologically
complex, the goal is the same: to create a tracking device that is not easily
deleted, and, if deleted, has the ability to ‘re-spawn’ or ‘un-delete’
itself. 120
E.

Concerns Regarding Behavioral Advertising

[31] A recent study by England’s consumer protection agency, the
Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”), found that 40% of consumers hold neutral
views towards behavioral advertising, 28% percent dislike the practice,
and 24% percent welcome it. 121 Additionally, the OFT found that
Journal Investigation: Shunned Profiling Method on the Verge of Comeback, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 24, 2010, at A1 (“[D]eep packet inspection [technology] . . . can be far more
powerful than ‘cookies’ . . . because it can be used to monitor all online activity, not just
Web browsing. Spy agencies use the technology for surveillance.”).
119

See Rodica Tirtea et al., Bittersweet Cookies: Some Security and Privacy
Considerations, EUROPEAN NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY 8 (2011) [hereinafter
ENISA
Cookie
Report],
available
at
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/it/
library/pp/cookies/.

120

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 6-7.

121

OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ONLINE TARGETING OF ADVERTISING AND PRICES: A
MARKET STUDY 7 (2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_lea
flets/659703/OFT1231.pdf. Similar studies in the United States and Canada have found
consumers are not in favor of behavioral advertising. See JANET LO, PUB. INTEREST
ADVOCACY CTR., A “DO NOT TRACK LIST” FOR CANADA 11 (2009), available at
www.piac.ca/files/dntl_final_ website.pdf (“The majority of respondents (54%) [in a
recent Canadian study] strongly supported the creation of a ‘Do Not Track List’, and an
additional 27% of respondents somewhat supported a ‘Do Not Track List’ . . . .”); JOSEPH
TUROW ET AL., CONTRARY TO WHAT MARKETERS SAY, AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED
ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT 15 (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214 (finding that 66% percent of American adults do not
want to be shown targeted advertising and that when told of how behavioral marketers
gather their information, this percentage jumped to between 73% and 86%).
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concerns over behavioral advertising decreased when consumers could, if
they desired, opt-out of behavioral advertising and its related tracking
activities. 122
[32] While individual concerns about behavioral advertising vary, many
people simply feel violated upon learning that ad-networks compile and
sell their personal details without their knowledge or consent. 123 For
instance, in the weeks leading up to a U.S. primary election last October, a
sixty-seven year old woman named Linda Twombly was bombarded with
advertisements urging her to donate and vote for a specific Republican
candidate. 124 The ads were eerily omniscient; Ms. Twombly was a
Republican and did have a history of donating to political campaigns. 125
However, the ads were not based on information Ms. Twombly had
volunteered to the candidate or the party. 126 Rather, they were based on
information sold to the candidate by a company whose algorithms
determined these facts from Ms. Twombly’s online behavior. 127
[33] Another recent example of such behavior is a teenage girl who saw
weight-loss ads every time she went on the Internet after an ad-network
identified her as falling within a category of people desiring to lose
weight. 128 There is also the infamous example of a man who bought his
122

OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121, at 36.

123

See HILDEBRANDT, supra note 97, at 242-43.

124

See Emily Steel, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal Investigation: A Web
Pioneer Profiles Users by Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2010, at A1.
125

See id.

126

See id.

127

See id.

128

Angwin, Gold Mine, supra note 115; see also Nicholas Carr, The Great Privacy
Debate -- Tracking Is an Assault on Liberty, with Real Dangers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6,
2010, (Weekend Journal), at W1; Transcript of Workship at 61:5-15, Fed. Trade Comm’n
Roundtable Series 1 on: Exploring Privacy (Dec. 7, 2009) (Matter No. P095416),
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wife a ring on Overstock.com only to have the purchase, complete with his
51% discount, broadcast on his Facebook newsfeed. 129
[34] Furthermore, behavioral advertising has practical and economic
consequences. The European Network and Information Security Agency
(“ENISA”) identified various technological threats presented by
behavioral advertising, including network threats, end-system threats, and
cookie-harvesting threats. 130
These techniques can modify the
information returned by cookies from a user’s computer to the adnetworks, secretly collect a user’s information by impersonating cookies
of legitimate websites, or recreate a user’s full search history from search
engines such as Google. 131
[35] Other threats revolve around the claim of anonymity for behavioral
profiles. While most companies insist any data collected remains
anonymous, newly created algorithms can “de-anonymize” these profiles
by adding names, addresses, and phone numbers. 132 A recent study found
that third-party trackers increasingly link “anonymous” profiles to
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/privacyroundtables/PrivacyRoundtable
_Dec2009_Transcript.pdf (describing the potential to target obese, anxious or other
vulnerable market niches).
129

See Sheppard Mullin, Efficiency v. Privacy: Is Online Behavioral Advertising Capable
of Self-Regulation?, COVERING YOUR ADS BLOG, (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://www.coveringyourads.com/2010/04/articles/advertising-law/efficiency-v-privacyis-online-behavioral-advertising-capable-of-selfregulation/.
130

See ENISA Cookie Report, supra note 119, at 7.

131

See id.

132

See Steel, supra note 124; see also Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online
Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439,
450 (2007) (noting that offline sources used by data brokers include public records, the
media and credit-reporting agencies and that data brokers “have been combining this offline data, traceable to specific individuals, with online data that they can match to those
same individuals”).
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personally identifiable information through the use of social networks. 133
One potential consequence of de-anonymization is the risk of identity theft
if an individual hacks into an ad-network’s database. 134 London
Economics performed a case study that examined a recent incident
involving TNS Infratest, a German marketing company engaged in
behavioral profiling. 135 The company held profiles on 90,000 German
households, many of which contained detailed information including
individuals’ names, addresses, dates of birth, education levels, marital
status, household incomes, bank accounts, health insurance and even
details on consumer purchases such as cars, mobile phones and
computers. 136 Unfortunately, the hacking of this database exposed all
90,000 profiles. 137
[36] Similarly, a recent study at Carnegie Mellon University showed
that hacking is not even necessary for identity theft. 138 Using the same
“anonymous” information generally found in behavioral advertising
profiles such as place of birth and birth date, computer algorithms can
determine Social Security numbers for “8.5% of people born in the United

133

ENISA Cookie Report, supra note 119, at 8; Balachander Krishnamurthy & Craig E.
Wills, On the Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information Via Online Social
Networks, 40 COMPUTER COMM. REV. 112, 117 (2010).
134

See LONDON ECON., STUDY ON
TECHNOLOGIES (PETS) 204 (2010).

135

Id. at 201-04.

136

Id. at 201-02.

THE

ECONOMIC BENEFITS

OF

PRIVACY-ENHANCING

137

Id. at 204 (discussing how the incentive to steal such data is high as a complete
consumer profile that includes bank credentials can sell for as much $1,000 a person).

138

Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public
Data, 106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 10975, 10975 (2009); Steve Lohr, How Privacy
Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0
3/17/technology/17privacy.html?scp=9&sq=%22do%20not%20track%22&st=Search.

26

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue1

States between 1989 and 2003.” 139 With access to the right software,
almost five million Social Security numbers are potentially up for sale. 140
[37] Widespread profiling also allows for price discrimination and
social sorting. 141 Online price discrimination, or even the outright denial
of service or products, is known as “weblining,” an online version of
traditional economic discrimination practices such as “redlining” and
“reverse redlining.” 142
Weblining can create pricing schemes to
discriminate between individual customers and can target especially
vulnerable populations such as the poor or uneducated. 143 Some of these
potential harms are already being realized. For example, British insurer
Aviva recently used online data profiles in order to categorize potential
insurance applicants in various risk profiles. 144
[38] Lee Tien, a senior staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, worries about what might happen if employers have access to
profiles which allows them to see whether an employee is pregnant or
considering trying to become pregnant. 145 Tien raises similar concerns
about other vulnerable populations that deserve anonymity, such as

139

Acquisti & Gross, supra note 138, at 10975; Lohr, supra note 138.

140

See Lohr, supra note 138.

141

See HILDEBRANDT, supra note 97, at 244.

142

See ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 105, at 13, n.45
(defining redlining and reverse redlining as “the practice of some financial institutions to
not extend credit or to offer less favorable credit terms to prospecitve [sic] borrowers in
predominantly minority areas”).
143

See LO, supra note 121, at 53.

144

Leslie Scism & Mark Maremont, Insurers Test Data Profiles to Identify Risky Clients,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2010, at A1.
145

Stein, supra note 1.
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political dissidents and battered women. 146 Other scholars worry about
the use of inaccurate data sets in determining the outcome of employment,
dating, or educational decisions. 147 Finally, as profiling becomes even
more commonplace, a user’s attempts to shield personal data will have
consequences of their own. 148 For instance, a user who attempts to hide
their data to remain anonymous may be discriminatorily denied service,
forced to pay more, or simply categorized for their refusal. 149
F.

Privacy by Design and Privacy Enhancing Technologies

[39] The fundamental principal of Privacy by Design (“PbD”) is that a
system should address privacy concerns in its design, as opposed to
addressing these concerns once the system has become vulnerable. 150 The
collection-limitation principle, one of the core principals of PbD systems,
requires that “the lawful collection of data” must take place with the
informed “knowledge or consent of the data subject.” 151 In this way, the
principals of PbD compare remarkably to the consent requirements in the
EU’s data protection framework. 152
[40] While the goal of PbD is technically possible today, few
businesses attempt to implement its principles. 153 To the contrary, Daniel
146

See id.

147

See id.

148

See LO, supra note 121, at 53 (claiming that online profiling may lead to a loss of
consumer autonomy).

149

See id.

150

DANIEL LE MÉTAYER, Privacy by Design: A Matter of Choice, in DATA PROTECTION
PROFILED WORLD 323-24 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2010).

IN A
151

Id. at 325.

152

See id.

153

See id. at 326.
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Le Métayer, a leading expert in PbD systems, argues that most online
systems actually fall into one of three categories, all of which fall short of
PbD ideals. 154 The first category is “non-privacy by design” where the
“system deliberately infringes privacy rights.” 155 Such systems are
common and include any online registration system that requires
information outside of what is required to process the immediate
transaction. 156 The next category is “non-privacy by non-design” where
privacy issues are ignored throughout the design process. 157 Such systems
include websites that do not offer opt-out mechanisms or lack internal
policies to destroy data after a set expiration period. 158 The last category
is “non-privacy by bad design” where the system’s design considers
privacy concerns but falls short in the end. 159
[41] PbD attempts to provide users with a meaningful way to express
their choices, despite the tendency of these choices to involve many
subtleties or ambiguities, and for the system to respect those choices. 160
For example, a PbD system must take into account that routine consent
does not have practical import. 161 Examples of the routinization of

154

See id.

155

MÉTAYER, supra note 150, at 326.

156

See id.

157

Id.

158

Id.

159

See id.

160

See MÉTAYER, supra note 150, at 327.

161

Roger Brownsword, Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and
Conﬁdentiality, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 83, 90 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds.,
2009).
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consent abound, as anyone who has clicked “I agree” when installing
software without reading the fine print well knows. 162
[42] Others argue for the use of Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(“PET”). Unlike Privacy by Design, PETs are not necessarily designed
into the systems that implement them. 163 A PET is defined as “[a]
technology whose primary purpose is to enhance the privacy of a user.” 164
A study for the Dutch Ministry of the Interior defined PETs as a
mechanism of “translation of ‘soft’ legal standards into ‘hard’ system
specifications.” 165 Successful PETs generally have a number of properties
in common, including usability, deployability, effectiveness, and
robustness. 166
[43] Many commentators suggest that PbD, PETs, or some combination
of both, may provide an answer to the threat to privacy posed by
behavioral advertising. 167 Such efforts are technologically feasible. For
162

See id. (mentioning routinisation by directing an agent to “sign here and here” or “just
tick the box”).

163

See LONDON ECON., supra note 134, at 14.

164

Jane K. Winn, Technical Standards as Data Protection Regulation, in REINVENTING
DATA PROTECTION? 191, 199 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009).
165

Id. (quoting KPMG ET AL., MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND KINGDOM RELATIONS,
PRIVACY–ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: WHITE PAPER FOR DECISION-MAKERS
51 (Dec. 2004), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download
?doi=10.1.1.101.7649&rep=rep1&type=pdf [hereinafter KPMG].

THE NETH.,

166

See LONDON ECON., supra note 134, at 14.

167

See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 44-52 (December 2010),
available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (recommending that
companies “assess the privacy impact of specific practices, products, and services to
evaluate risks and ensure that the company follows appropriate procedures to mitigate
EPIC.ORG,
those
risks”);
Online
Tracking
and
Behavioral
Profiling,
http://epic.org/privacy/consumer/online_tracking_and_behavioral.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2010).
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instance, the browser Firefox recently announced it would implement a
Do-Not-Track feature into the next version of its web browser, while
Microsoft implements a similar initiative in Internet Explorer 9. 168
However, for these technologies to work, advertising networks must agree
to respect users’ settings. 169 To date, not a single company has agreed to
participate in either of these programs. 170
G.

Attempts at Self-Regulation
Advertising Industry

in

the

Behavioral

[44] Recently, the behavioral advertising industry has begun a renewed
attempt at self-regulation. 171 Each of the major efforts, one in the U.S.
and one in the EU, offers consumers information regarding behavioral
advertising, creates a framework of best practices which member adnetworks promise to abide by, and gives consumers the opportunity to optout of behavioral advertising from selected ad-networks. 172 Despite the
apparent progress evidenced by these efforts, many commentators

168

Julia Angwin, Web Tool on Firefox to Deter Tracking, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748704213404576100441609997236.html;
Cade Metz, Google, MS, Mozilla: Three 'Do Not Tracks' To Woo Them All: So Many
Ways to Do One Simple Thing, THE REG. UK (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/14/google_mozilla_and_microsoft_do_do_not_trac
k/.
169

See Angwin, Web Tool, supra note 168.

170

See id.

171

See generally Digital Adver. Alliance, The Self-Regulatory Principles for Online
Behavioral Advertising, THE SELF-REG. PROGRAM FOR ONLINE BEHAV. PROGRAMMING,
http://www.aboutads.info/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011); IAB Good Practice Principles,
YOUR ONLINE CHOICES, http://www.youronlinechoices.com/good-practice-principles (last
visited Sept. 25, 2011).
172

See Digital Adver. Alliance, supra note 171; IAB Good Practice Principles, supra
note 171.
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question whether self-regulation provides the entire answer, given the
behavioral advertising industry’s contrary incentives. 173
[45] In The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, SelfRegulation, or Co-Regulation?, Professor Dennis Hirsh outlines three
broad critiques of self-regulation in online privacy. First, “firms will put
their own profits before ahead of the public interest [in privacy].” 174
Second, self-regulatory programs generally lack the power or will to truly
enforce the guidelines against its members. 175 Third, as long as
membership in self-regulatory programs remains voluntary, most
companies will choose to “free ride” on any good-will generated by the
programs without restriction by the guidelines themselves. 176
[46] The first critique argues that it is not in the best economic interest
of the ad-networks to effectively enroll consumers because each
enrollment hurts their bottom line. 177 As an illustration of this argument,
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) points out that the
telecommunication industry’s self-regulatory efforts in the 1990’s
managed to enroll just about 5 million consumers, versus the over 200
million now registered in the FTC’s Do-Not-Call list. 178 The trend will

173

See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY SELF
REGULATION: A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTMENT 1, 15 (2005) [hereinafter EPIC], available
at http://epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.html; Scott Foster, Online Profiling Is on the
Rise: How Long Until the United States and the European Union Lose Patience with SelfRegulation?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 258, 277 (2000); Mullin, supra note 129.
174

Hirsch , supra note 132, at 458.

175

Id.

176

Id. at 459.

177

See id. at 468.

178

Compare EPIC, supra note 173, at 1, with Nate Anderson, Do Not Call List Tops 200
Million, Some Scammers Still Ignore It, ARSTECHNICA.COM, http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2010/07/telemarketing-remember-just-how-bad-it-was.ars (last visited Sept.
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most likely hold for behavioral advertising; in fact, the Network
Advertising Initiative (“NAI”), the central mechanism for the new U.S.
opt-out initiative, has offered a version of its new opt-out service, with
little to no success. 179
[47] The second critique argues that, in addition to the limitations
imposed by its voluntary membership, initiatives such as the NAI opt-out
cannot be entirely successful because they lack the accountability and
enforcement opportunities offered by equivalent government regulation. 180
In this vein, some commentators argue that because consumers have no
way to monitor a company’s use of their information, they cannot
discipline the company efficiently in the marketplace for violations. 181
[48] Third, maintaining a significant membership in a voluntary
program such as NAI or IAB is unlikely. 182 Critics point to NAI’s
previous attempts at self-regulation as evidence. 183 In 2000, NAI initiated
a self-regulatory regime for online privacy and even appointed an
independent organization to enforce violations. 184 However, while the
program started with twelve of the largest ad-networks, by 2003, its
membership dwindled to just two. 185 The independent enforcer slowly
15, 2011) (discussing how the Federal Trade Commission acknowledged the Do Not Call
registry’s passing 200 million in numbers).
179

See EPIC, supra note 173, at 9-10.

180

See id. at 10.

181

See Foster, supra note 173 at 262, 266.

182

See Hirsch, supra note 132, at 458-59.

183

Id. at 462.

184

Id.

185

Id. at 463; see EPIC, supra note 173, at 9-10 (“Further contributing to the irrelevance
of NAI is the fact that its membership has depleted to two: DoubleClick and Atlas
DMT.”).
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stopped reporting compliance and enforcement statistics and, in 2006,
scrapped the entire program. 186
[49] Finally, some critics argue that scattered self-regulatory programs
are ineffective because users have to find, learn about, and apply to a
potentially large number of competing opt-out programs. 187 This is
compounded in the behavioral advertising industry because the opt-out
programs are generally limited to a small subset of ad-networks that
choose to participate. 188 Additionally, opt-out programs vary in efficacy.
DoubleClick, a large advertiser, will still show users targeted ads even if
they opt-out. 189 DoubleClick only promises not to use what they
themselves consider personal information to generate the ads. 190 Finally,
self-regulated opt-out programs are generally temporary because they rely
on the user to not clear their cookies, a task many users concerned about
privacy regularly do. 191
III.

ANALYSIS

[50] This Part will argue that the EU’s current legal framework is
incapable of providing consumers with a meaningful method to consent or
refuse to consent to behavioral advertising. It will then argue that
186

Id.

187

See Hirsch, supra note 132, at 455.

188

See generally Digital Adver. Alliance, supra note 171 (“You can now visit the beta
version of the Program’s Consumer Opt Out Page, which allows users to conveniently
opt-out from online behavioral ads served by some or all of our participating
companies.” (emphasis added)); IAB Good Practice Principles, supra note 171
(providing a list of companies that are complying with the IAB Good Practice Principles).
189

190

191

LO, supra note 121, at 50.
Id.
See id.
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requiring a “Do-Not-Track” mechanism in the revised Data Protection
Directive satisfies the Treaty of Lisbon, meets the twin objectives of the
original Directive, and fulfills the five applicable revision objectives as
expressed by the Commission. 192 It will also consider and respond to
various technological and economic criticisms of a Do-Not-Track
mechanism. Finally, the Article will argue against alternative solutions,
including self-regulation.
A.

The Current Data Protection Framework

[51] The EU’s data protection framework, as set out by the Data
Protection Directive, e-Privacy Directives and the Treaty of Lisbon,
purports to guarantee citizens the right to the protection of personal
data. 193 Behavioral advertisers must operate within the confines of the
data protection framework because behavioral advertising requires the
collection and use of Internet users’ personal data to track and target
individuals based on their online activities. 194 Ad-networks who engage
in behavioral advertising must secure informed consent from users before
engaging in behavioral advertising, or they risk violating a user’s right to
the protection of personal data. 195
[52] Today, many experts believe that behavioral advertising violates a
citizen’s right to the protection of personal data because ad-networks
generally fail to secure informed consent from the user. 196 The failure to
192

Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 5-10; see Treaty of Lisbon art. 16 B; Data
Protection Directive, supra note 10, Preamble para. 7.
193

Treaty of Lisbon art. 16 B; Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, Preamble para. 7;
e-Privacy Directive, supra note 26.

194

See supra Part II.D.

195

See id. at 4.

196

See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 9; infra Part
II.B.iii.
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prevent such violations stems from the ambiguity surrounding the
meaning of consent, which the data protection framework does not
define. 197 The failure to sufficiently define consent in the directives has
frustrated efforts to clarify the meaning of consent in case law,
enforcement efforts, and national implementing legislation. 198 As a result
of this ambiguity, ad-networks may act in violation of citizens’ rights
without consequence. 199 In 2010, the Commission called for an overhaul
of the Directive, in part because of such ambiguities. 200
[53] It is crucial to note that past attempts to rectify issues in the data
protection framework, including the adoption of the e-Privacy Directive
and its amending Directive, have failed to resolve the ambiguity over the
meaning of consent under the framework. 201 By attempting to rectify the
issue, the newer directives made similar mistakes as the original Data
Protection Directive, namely, making ambiguous statements regarding
informed and free consent and leaving the actual implementation and
interpretation of its provisions to the twenty-seven EU Member States. 202
To meet the Commission’s stated goal of a uniform regulation that
provides users with a chance to effectuate informed and free consent to
behavioral advertising, any revision of the Data Protection Directive will
have to be clearer and more specific than its predecessor legislation. 203
197

See EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION REVISION, supra note 87, at 12 (“The Directive
contains a number of provisions that are broadly formulated and that therefore leave
significant room for diverging implementation.”).

198

See id.; Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 8-9; supra Part II.B.iii.

199

This is evidenced by the size of the behavioral advertising industry and the lack of
enforcement actions over potential violations. See supra Part II.B.iii.
200

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 8-9.

201

See id.

202

See generally id.

203

See id. at 7-8.
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Proposal

[54] A universal “Opt-Out” or “Do-Not-Track” mechanism satisfies the
right to the protection of personal data, including the requirement of
informed and free consent, under the Treaty of Lisbon and EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. 204 The mechanism also meets the twin aims of the
original Data Protection Directive, as well as each of the five applicable
objectives outlined by the European Commission for the Data Protection
Directive’s revision. 205
i. Framework for Potential Solutions
[55] Any proposal for the revision of the Data Protection Directive must
satisfy a variety of parameters. First, any solution must, at its most basic
level, satisfy the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in that “data must be
processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of
the person concerned . . . .” 206 As discussed above, in the case of
behavioral advertising, the current framework fails to secure this right. 207
Second, any proposal should attempt to meet the twin aims of the original
Data Protection Directive: the protection of personal data and the free flow
of information in commerce. 208 Furthermore, since the adoption of the
Treaty of Lisbon, the protection of personal data is more than an aim—it is

204

See generally Treaty of Lisbon art. 68; EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note
18, at 10 (explaining rights of protection for personal data).
205

See generally Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 5-10 (outlining twin aims and five
objectives).
206

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 18, at 10; see Call for Revision, supra
note 13, at 11.
207

See generally supra Part II.B.ii (discussing problems with the current framework).

208

Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 2; Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, paras.
2-3.
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a constitutionally guaranteed right. 209 Finally, the Commission has
outlined additional objectives for the revised legislation. Five of these
objectives are applicable to, and resolved by, the current proposal: (1)
ensuring a coherent application of data protection rules; (2) providing a
mechanism for users to effectuate informed and free consent; (3)
strengthening individuals' rights in the face of new technologies; (4)
increasing transparency; and (5) providing users increased control over
their data. 210
ii.

The Do-Not-Track Mechanism

[56] A Do-Not-Track mechanism would utilize PbD and PET principles
to build a tool that allows a user to provide informed and free consent
through their web browser. 211 As suggested by the Dutch Ministry of the
Interior, the use of PETs would “[translate] the ‘soft’ legal standards” of
the data protection directives “into ‘hard’ system specifications” that
create a unified mechanism for informed and free consent for every citizen
in the EU. 212
[57] The Do-Not-Track mechanism could work as follows: every
browser would have an initial settings wizard where the user could choose
their level of exposure to targeted advertisements while using the
Internet. 213 Users would receive information on behavioral advertising
generally, and could read in greater detail about specific ad-networks,
including their methods of data collection and types of analysis employed.
209

See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 21, at 68; Press Release, Charter of Fundamental
Rights, supra note 20.
210

Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 5-10.

211

See Angwin, Web Tool, supra note 168; Metz, supra note 168; Winn, supra note 164,
at 199; see also supra Part II.F.
212

Winn, supra note 164, at 199; KPMG, supra note 165.

213

See Angwin, Web Tool, supra note 168; Metz, supra note 168.
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This wizard would be legally mandatory for a browser to offer to a user
before the user is allowed to use a browser for the first time. 214 Finally,
the mechanism would never exclude first-party cookies so basic Internet
functionality remains undisturbed. 215 After a user sets their choices, adnetworks could request permission from users to be added as an exception
to a user’s general preference set. This request should conform to the
suggestions for transparency outlined by the Working Party. 216 Thus, any
request would need to include the types of data collected, the purposes of
the collection, and the potential uses of the data by third parties. 217
iii.

Satisfaction of Informed and Free Consent

[58] First, and most importantly, the mechanism would satisfy the
Treaty of Lisbon by providing users with the chance to express informed
and free consent to tracking and behavioral advertising. 218 While the
Treaty of Lisbon uses general language regarding consent, the courts,
enforcement authorities, and Article 29 Working Party have offered a
limited degree of clarification. 219 A Do-Not-Track mechanism would
satisfy the findings of the courts and enforcement authorities that silence
does not indicate consent. 220 The principal that silence cannot equal
214

See generally supra Part II.B.ii (discussing the current issues with user data
protection, and the need for a better method of informing users of data protection
options).

215

See supra Part II.D (discussing how first party cookies allow storage of logins, layout
preferences, payment methods or shipping addresses).

216

WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 15.

217

See id. at 12-13.

218

See Treaty of Lisbon art. 16 B.

219

WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 13-17.

220

See, e.g., Case C-28/08 P, Comm'n v. Bavarian Lager Co., 2010 EUR-Lex LEXIS
687, at *42 (June 29, 2010) (“By requiring that, in respect of the five persons who had
not given their express consent, Bavarian Lager establish the necessity for those personal
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consent, derived from the Bavarian Lager and British Gas cases, contrasts
with the current norm in many EU Member States where browser settings,
even if left on default, are sufficient evidence of a user’s intent to provide
consent. 221 Under the current proposal, users must make an informed,
affirmative decision; eliminating the risk that a user’s silence could
suggest consent to an ad-network. 222
[59] To qualify as informed consent, the Data Protection Directive
mandates that data subjects should be notified of the “identity of the [data]
controller . . . the purposes of the processing . . . [and] any further
information . . . in so far as such further information is necessary . . . to
guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject.” 223 The Working
Party agrees that for truly informed consent, a user must receive
transparent information regarding the placement of the tracking cookie. 224
The Do-Not-Track mechanism also satisfies this mandate. Under the
proposal, Member States, national DPA’s, or the Working Party could be
data to be transferred, the Commission complied with the provisions of Article 8(b) of
Regulation No 45/2001.”).
221

Compare id., and CAREY, supra note 9, at 66-67, with Warma & Kemppainen, supra
note 32 (noting that Recital 66 of the E-Privacy Directive permits consent to be obtained
via browser settings, the defaults of which generally allow cookies).
222

See Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 7(a); see also, WP29 Opinion on
Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 13 (“[F]or consent to be valid . . . it
must be freely given, specific and constitute an informed indication of the data subject’s
wishes . . . before the personal data are collected, as a necessary measure to ensure that
data subjects can fully appreciate that they are consenting and what they are consenting
to.”).
223

Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 10.

224

WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 17-18 (“The data
subject should be clearly informed that the cookie will allow the advertising provider to
collect information about visits to other websites, the advertisements they have been
shown, which ones they have clicked on, timing etc.,” in such a manner that is “clear and
comprehensive” and “as user friendly as possible”) (quoting Data Protection Directive,
supra note 10, art. 10) (emphasis omitted).
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tasked with creating the information presented to a user during the setup
process in each user’s browser. A user may consider the choice of
whether and to what extent to consent to behavioral advertising, utilizing
objective information provided by a trustworthy source. This proposal
represents a stark contrast from the status quo, in which consent appears to
be sufficient no matter how uninformed the user happens to be. 225
[60] Finally, the Working Party’s interpretation of informed and free
consent mandates that consent be easily revocable. 226 Under the Do-NotTrack proposal, by using a universal setting through the browser, a user
could switch between allowing third-party tracking for all purposes, to
allowing tracking for certain narrow purposes, to never allowing tracking
at all, simply with the click of a button.
iv.

Satisfaction of the European Commission’s
Objectives for Revision

[61] The proposal for a Do-Not-Track mechanism also elegantly meets
the stated objectives of the European Commission for the revision of the
Data Protection Directive. 227 First, the mechanism would ensure a
coherent application of data protection rules, because the Do-Not-Track
mechanism would be consistently implemented throughout the EU. 228
Under the proposal, ad-networks would have to respect a user’s decision
to opt-out of all behavioral tracking, no matter what country the user is
from, or what country the ad-network operates in. 229
225

See, e.g., WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 11
(“[T]he visitor's browser . . . automatically transfers such information to the ad network
provider . . . because the publisher . . . set[s] up its web site in such a way that the visitor
to its own web site is automatically redirected to the ad network provider web site.”).
226

Id. at 13 (“[C]onsent must be revocable.”).

227

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 5, 10, 13, 15, 17.

228

See id. at 10.

229

See id.; WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 23.
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[62] The proposal would not only benefit Internet users, but also adnetworks and other economic stakeholders, because the proposal would
provide ad-networks and content providers with the certainty of whether
they may engage in behavioral advertising with regard to a given user.
Further, the proposal will enhance the free flow of information because
resolving ambiguities over the definition of consent will “enhance legal
certainty, reduce the administrative burden, and ensure a level playing
field for economic operators.” 230
[63] Second, the Do-Not-Track proposal would provide a mechanism
for a user to effectuate their informed and free consent. 231 Part III(B)iii,
above, discusses in detail the sufficiency of a Do-Not-Track mechanism to
provide informed and free consent under the law. A Do-Not-Track
proposal would inform individuals of their rights and make them fully
aware they are consenting. Third, the Do-Not-Track platform would
increase transparency by providing objective information to the user
before making a choice. 232 So long as the language used is “easy to
understand . . . and plain language is used” the Do-Not-Track mechanism
will satisfy the Commission’s recommendations. 233
[64] Fourth, the mechanism would strengthen individuals' rights in the
face of new technologies because the Do-Not-Track platform would be
technologically neutral. A Do-Not-Track mechanism is technologically
neutral because it would avoid banning certain technologies over others.
Instead, it would alert ad-networks not to track a specific user, no matter
what technology was used. The Do-Not-Track mechanism would also
strengthen a user’s individual rights by alerting a user that an ad-network

230

EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION REVISION, supra note 87, at 12.

231

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 8-9.

232

See id. at 6-7.

233

Id. at 6.
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had violated its privacy choices. The browser technology could
automatically check for cookies placed without the permission of the user,
and the technology could be updated as needed to recognize new
technologies as they were invented. 234 These alerts could also help
increase enforcement actions by documenting violations of the data
protection rules. 235
[65] Fifth, a Do-Not-Track mechanism would provide users increased
control over their own data in a variety of ways. Not only could users
specifically choose with whom they shared their information and how it
should be used, the user could also choose to implement a strategy of data
minimization. This strategy could allow the user to decrease their risk of
identity theft through hacking or fraud, or simply provide a user with the
feeling of autonomy that comes from the control of their own personal
information.
C.

Challenges to a Do-Not-Track List

[66] Critics commonly offer four main challenges to the
implementation of a Do-Not-Track mechanism. First, critics assert that a
Do-Not-Track mechanism would destroy the basic functionality of the
Internet. 236 Second, that a mechanism placing users on a Do-Not-Track

234

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 6 (“The Commission will consider how to
ensure a coherent application of data protection rules, taking into account the impact of
new technologies on individuals’ rights and freedoms . . . .”).

235

See id. at 9.

236

See Jack Marshall, Feasibility of FTC 'Do-Not-Track' Option in Doubt, CLICKZ.COM
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/1930130/feasibility-ftc-track-optiondoubt (statement of Pam Horan, president of Online Publishers Association) ("We’re
concerned about the concept of do-not-track if it specifically impacts the first party
[publisher sites] . . . . Cookies are really critical to the operation of publishers' websites
to do a variety of things.").
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list would in-itself place users’ privacy at risk. 237 Third, that by
destroying a premium income stream, many websites will not be able to
stay in business, or will be forced to bombard users with generic ads. 238
And fourth, that a Do-Not-Track mechanism is technologically
infeasible. 239
[67] The first argument is misguided in that it assumes a Do-Not-Track
mechanism would simply block all cookies, thus removing functionality
such as saved logins, favorite shipping addresses or customized page
layouts. 240 However, as discussed above, the Do-Not-Track mechanism
would simply alert ad-networks not to track a user; the mechanism would
not block cookies on its own. Furthermore, the system would not ban or
even discourage the use of first party cookies. Consequently, under the
current proposal, the concerns of the first critique are moot.

237

See Heather Osborn Ng, Targeting Bad Behavior: Why Federal Regulators Must Treat
Online Behavioral Marketing as Spyware, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 369, 386-87
(2009) ( “[A] ‘do not track’ registry could cause more privacy problems than it fixes . . . .
[A] ‘do not track’ program would allow the government to collect too much personally
identifiable information from the public . . . .”).
238

See Catherine Holahan, 'Do Not Track' Could Backfire, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Nov. 5, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov20
07/tc2007114_372892.htm (discussing how the adoption of Do-Not-Track could lead to a
barrage of extra advertising because of the lost value in showing behavioral ads); Edward
Wyatt, Legislators Support Internet Privacy, but Question How to Achieve It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at B3 (statement of Joan Gillman, executive vice president of Time
Warner Cable) (“[D]o-not-track could hinder job creation within the advertising industry
and by Web sites that rely on advertising revenues, [as well as] inhibit innovation and the
development of new services.”).
239

See Christopher Wolf, We Don't Need 'Do Not Track', BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Nov. 12, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov
2007/tc2007119_029422.htm (“Compiling and applying a list of those who do not want
tailored advertising will be a technological nightmare.”).

240

See Marshall, supra note 236.
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[68] The second argument, that a Do-Not-Track mechanism creates its
own privacy risks, 241 does not apply to the specifics of this proposal.
Unlike the FTC’s Do-Not-Call list, 242 users’ IP addresses or other
identifying information would not be placed in a central list accessible to
advertisers. Here, rather than creating a central list, the browser itself
alerts companies not to track and target an anonymous user. 243 This alert
need not contain any personal information beyond the fact the user does
not wish to be tracked.
[69] The third and most widely voiced critique is that a Do-Not-Track
mechanism will end the Internet as we know it by eliminating a major
source of premium advertising revenue. 244 This critique is premised on
the notion that behavioral ads sell for multiple times that of a generic
advertisement. 245 Critics argue that the option to opt-out will limit the
number of behavioral advertisements shown to users, and therefore fewer
ads will command premium pricing on any given website. 246 There are
some important flaws and caveats to this line of reasoning.
[70] Under current EU Law, including the Directives and the Treaty of
Lisbon, users already have the ability to consent or refuse to consent to the

241

See Ng, supra note 237, at 386.

242

Cf. Rebecca Bolin, Note, Opting Out of Spam: A Domain Level Do-Not-Spam
Registry, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 429 (2006).

243

See Kristen J. Mathews & Margaret Dale, What Do You Really Need to Know About
the FTC’s Recent Report on Privacy?, 19 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 33 (2011).

244

See, e.g., Holahan, supra note 238; Wyatt, supra note 238.

245

See Angwin, Gold Mine, supra note 115 (“Targeted ads command a premium. Last
year, the average cost of a targeted ad was $4.12 per thousand viewers, compared with
$1.98 per thousand viewers for an untargeted ad, according to an ad-industry-sponsored
study in March.”).
246

See, e.g., Holahan, supra note 238; Wyatt, supra note 238.
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use of their personal data in the behavioral advertising context. 247 In this
sense, the Do-Not-Track mechanism only changes the ease with which
users can express their already existent legal rights. More effective
enforcement of existing laws and regulations should not be framed as a
negative, even if there is an economic impact. Because a Do-Not-Track
mechanism would simply increase the efficiency with which consumers
can express their legal rights, ad-networks have no right to complain about
potential economic losses. Importantly, many users will choose to
ultimately allow behavioral advertising. 248 In the most recent European
study, almost 65% of respondents stated opinions either neutral to or in
favor of targeted ads. 249 A majority of the premium income stream should
remain viable after the implementation of a Do-Not-Track mechanism. 250
Finally, online advertising only accounts for 10% of total advertising
expenditures, and this has only been the case for the past few years. 251
Websites provided free content supported by advertising revenue before
behavioral advertising became a widespread phenomenon.
D.

Alternative Solutions
i.

Self-Regulation

[71] The advertising industry has had fifteen years since the adoption of
the Data Protection Directive in which to institute meaningful selfregulation. 252 By all accounts, they have failed. 253 The recent and widely
247

See EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION REVISION, supra note 87, at 12. See generally
Treaty of Lisbon Declarations 20, 21; Data Protection Directive, supra note 10,
Preamble, para. 9; e-Privacy Directive, supra note 26.

248

See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121, at 7.

249
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251

See IAB, supra note 94, at 10.

252

See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 2.

46

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue1

publicized initiative by the Internet Advertising Bureau UK must be
viewed with a certain amount of skepticism. 254 Rather than viewing this
latest attempt as the industry finally deciding to address the privacy
concerns created by behavioral advertising, it represents the industry’s
last-ditch attempt to avoid stricter regulation.
[72] As discussed above in Part II(G), self-regulation fails at providing
the rights and protections guaranteed by the data protection framework
and Treaty of Lisbon for three key reasons. 255 First, ad-networks have no
economic incentive to succeed at self-regulation beyond the level
necessary to delay or prevent actual regulation. 256 Second, self-regulation
programs generally lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms. 257 Third,
self-regulation initiatives are voluntary and result in scattered systems that
fail to present a single and easily usable consent mechanism for the
consumer. 258 Historical analogs also suggest that self-regulatory efforts
are doomed to be insufficient, while eventual governmental regulations,
such as the Do-Not-Call list in the U.S., have found vast success. 259
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numbers are on the US Do Not Call list, and the government has generally forbidden all
telemarketing calls. Taken together, these two rules fundamentally changed the
telemarketing business.”).
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Suggestions of the Article 29 Working Party

[73] The Article 29 Working Party’s primary recommendation, that a
user give their informed consent upon the placement of any third-party
cookie is impractical. 260 A user would have to decide to accept or reject
every third-party cookie an ad-network attempted to place on their
computer, a task, which could easily tally in the thousands during
everyday browsing. 261 Many of the Internet’s most visited websites install
over one hundred third-party cookies during a single visit. 262 To require a
user to make an individual decision regarding each cookie is impossible
without destroying the usability of the Internet. 263 Even if this solution
has the advantage of allowing users to exactingly distinguish between an
ad-network with moderate tracking practices and those with extreme or
experimental practices, it is impractical to design a system that requires
such repeated consent from the user.
[74] To combat this flaw, the Working Party suggests that consent to a
third-party cookie should last for a full year. 264 This does not solve the
problem, however, because each visit to a new website would still be
painful or impossible for the user. 265 Finally, even if a user was forced to
go through a yes/no decision based on unique information for each adnetwork, the challenges of “consent fatigue” and general apathy will
260
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261
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render the choices meaningless, thus destroying the possibility of
meaningful consent that the mechanism should provide. 266
IV.

CONCLUSION

[75] This Article argues for a wide reaching and comprehensive
proposal, yet some additional steps remain. First, the browser technology
will need to be perfected. Currently Firefox and Internet Explorer are
developing technologies that could provide the basis for a Do-Not-Track
mechanism. 267 Under this proposal, the Do-Not-Track technology would
need to be uniform across browsers and be technologically capable of
functioning in the manner outlined by this Article. 268 This process will
take both time and money, and the question remains of who should pay for
this development. 269
[76] Second, Member States, DPA’s, the Article 29 Working Party, the
European Data Protection Supervisor, or some combination thereof, would
need to conduct a public awareness campaign before implementing the
Do-Not-Track platform. 270 Alerting users of their privacy choices and
explaining them beforehand would minimize the risk of users simply
clicking through the consent wizard upon installation. 271 It is important to
266
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270
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privacy rights through “consumer and business education campaigns”).
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alert consumers to the benefits of targeted advertising, including increased
relevancy of advertisements and coupons, so that consumers can make
objective choices. 272
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See Metz, supra note 168.
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